Nhận diện chiến lược bá quyền của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông

Chú thích:

[1] Xin, ‘Cooperation Opportunity’, 605 (citation omitted).
[2] Ivan Lidarev, ‘2017: A Tough Year for China-India Relations’, Diplomat, January 4, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/2017-a-tough-year-for-china-india-relations/ (accessed September 11, 2018).
[3] C. Uday Bhaskar, ‘China’s WMD Cooperation with Pakistan Looms over Xi-Modi Talks’, Reuters, September 15, 2014, http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2014/09/15/chinas-wmd-cooperation-with-pakistan-looms-over-xi-modi-talks/ (accessed September 11, 2018).
[4] Dharisha Bastians and Gardiner Harris, ‘Chinese Leader Visits Sri Lanka, Challenging India’s Sway’, New York Times, September 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/world/asia/chinese-leader-visits-sri-lanka-chipping-away-at-indias-sway.html (accessed September 11, 2018).
[5] Shannon Tiezzi, ‘The Philippines’ UNCLOS Claim and the PR Battle Against China’, Diplo-mat, April 1, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-philippines-unclos-claim-and-the-pr-battle-against-china/ (accessed September 11, 2018).
[6] Aileen S.P. Baviera, ‘The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: The Case of Philippines-China Relations after 2004’ (RSIS Working Paper No. 241, 5 June 2012), 16, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP241.pdf (accessed Sep-tember 11, 2018).
[7] Ibid., 18.
[8] Ibid., 19 (citation omitted).
[9] Ibid., 25 (citation omitted).
[10] Richard Javad Heydarian, ‘Here’s Why the South China Sea Dispute will Continue to Haunt Philippine-China Relations’, Huffington Post, July 25, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/south-china-sea-dispute-duterte_us_597603aae4b09e5f6cd0d53b (accessed Sep-tember 12, 2018).
[11]Austin Ramzydec, ‘Loss by Taiwan Governing Party Raises Fears that ties with China will Sour’, New York Times, December, 26 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/world/asia/if-it-shrugs-off-chinas-embrace-taiwan-risks-more-than-just-trade-ties.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&region=Footer&module=MoreInSection&pgtype=article (accessed September 12, 2018).
[12] China may have a plan for civil society, as evidenced by its credit and social engineering plans. Simina Mistreanu, ‘Life Inside China’s Social Credit Laboratory’, Foreign Policy, April, 3 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-social-credit-laboratory/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[13] Zhao Hong, ‘China-Philippines Relations Stunted by the South China Sea Dispute’ (ISEAS Perspective #17; 28 March 2013), 1–8, 3, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2013_17.pdf.
[14] Poling, ‘Why a SCS Diplomatic Breakthrough’.
[15] One example is China’s selective use of anti-monopoly and “safety” regulations. See Harding,‘Has US-China Policy Failed?’, 97.
[16] Ricky Yeh, ‘Over-dependence on China will Doom Taiwan’, Diplomat, August 26, 2014 http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/over-dependence-on-china-will-doom-taiwan/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[17] Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, ‘Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional Relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (15 November 2011): 39.
[18] Ibid., 40 (citation omitted).
[19] Ibid., 42.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 41 (citations omitted).
[22] On this discussion, see Ibid.
[23] Ibid., 42.
[24] Ibid., 44.
[25] Language is a social construct as philosophers have long noted. Regarding the SCS, Carl Thayer has railed against the phrase “island reclamation” when in fact Beijing is creating islands. See Thayer, ‘No, China is Not Reclaiming’. Similarly, China’s behaviour has long been labeled as “assertive,” though perhaps not “newly assertive.” See Alistair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness’, International Security 37, no. 4
(Spring 2013): 7–48. It seems appropriate at this stage to reclassify China’s behaviour for what it is: aggression.
[26] Heydarian, ‘Here’s why the South China Sea’.
[27] Roger Haddick, ‘Salami Slicing in the South China Sea’, Foreign Policy, August 3, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[28] Ibid.
[29] Quoting Major General Zhang Zhaozhong of the PLA, published in May 28, 2013 issue of China Daily Mail http://chinadailymail.com/2013/05/28/china-boasts-of-strategy-to-recover-islands-occupied-by-philippines/ in Rodel Rodis, ‘China’s Salami-Slicing Cabbage Strategy to Seize Philippine Islands and Reefs’, Global Balita, June 13, 2013, http://globalbalita.com/2013/06/13/chinas-salami-slicing-cabbage-strategy-to-seize-philippine-islands-and-reefs/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[30] See generally, Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building’, December 14, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[31] Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘China’s New Spratly Island Defenses’, December 15, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-new-spratly-island-defenses/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[32] Quoting Major General Zhang Zhaozhong of the PLA, published in May 28, 2013 issue of China Daily Mail http://chinadailymail.com/2013/05/28/china-boasts-of-strategy-to-recover-islands-occupied-by-philippines/ in Rodis, ‘China’s Salami-Slicing Cabbage’.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] On China’s official figure released by the Ministry of Finance on 5 March 2018 as well as an explanation for wide-ranging estimates, see Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘What does China Really Spend on its Military’, https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/ (accessed September 12, 2018). While not equal to US spending, China’s spending is higher than it appears because of China does not disclose significant military expenditures such as foreign purchases. Domestic purchases, meanwhile, should be adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity, which implies greater spending.
[36] See ibid. On China’s claimed 2016 military budget, see ‘China Raises 2016 Defense Spending by 7.6%’, DefenceNews, March 6, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/home/2016/03/06/china-raises-2016-defense-spending-by-7-6/ (accessed September 12, 2018).
[37] Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016’ (16 April 2016): 77, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018).
[38] ‘The Real U.S.-China War Asia Should Worry About: The “Range War”’, National Interest, July 25, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-us-china-war-asia-should-worry-about-the-range-war-10952 (accessed September 12, 2018).
[39] See generally, Xin, ‘Cooperation Opportunity’.
[40] Ibid., 606–7.
[41] On counter-intervention, especially on the operational level, see Heath and Erickson, ‘Is China Pursuing’, 143–56.
[42] Jeremy Page, ‘China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance’, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738 (WSJ online) (accessed September 12, 2018).
[43] Heath and Erickson, “Is China Pursuing’, especially 144–47.
[44] See, Ronald O’Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Naval Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, September 8, 2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (accessed September 12, 2018).
[45] For one example, Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, ‘China’, Space Threat Assessment 2018 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 April 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2018 (accessed Sep-tember 12, 2018).
[46] China is also making rapid gains in manned and unmanned aircraft. It flies highly capable fourth generation Russian aircraft such as the SU-30 and the SU-35. More importantly, it appears to be mastering state of the art electronics and engine manufacturing, areas in which it has traditionally lagged. The debate continues on the quality of China’s jet engines, but progress is being made and this key obstacle to technological military equivalence with the West is being eroded. See Eugene K. Chow, ‘China May Have Solved the One Thing that was Poised to Stop Its Military Rise’, National Interest, January 20, 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-may-have-solved-the-one-thing-was-poised-stop-its-24149 (accessed September 12, 2018). On the impact of additive manufacturing on China’s ability to produce high performance military hardware such as jet engines and quiet nuclear attack submarines, see Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe, ‘3-D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Nonproliferation Challenge’, Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 7–19.
[47] Matthew Hallex, ‘China’s Mighty Missile Threat: What Should America Do about It?’ National Interest, September 13, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-mighty-missile-threat-what-should-america-do-about-it-11271 (accessed September 12, 2018).
[48] See generally, Evan Montgomery, ‘China’s Missile Forces are Growing: Is it Time to Modify the INF Treaty’, National Interest, July 2, 2014, available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-missile-forces-are-growing-it-time-modify-the-inf-10791 (accessed Septem-ber 12, 2018).
[49] Michael Chase, PLA Rocket Force Modernization and China’s Military Reforms (Rand Cor-poration, CT-489). Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on February 15, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT489.html (accessed September 12, 2018). See also, Hallex, ‘The Real U.S.-China War’ and Andrew Erickson, ‘Chinese Anti-ship Missile Development and Counter-Intervention Efforts’, Testimony before Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons Panel I: China’s Hyper-sonic and Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicle Programs, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 23, 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Erickson_Testimony.pdf. (accessed September 12, 2018).
[50] Rui C. Barbosa, ‘China Launches Kuaizhou-2 in Second Launch within 24 Hours’, NASA Spaceflight.com, November 21, 2014, http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/11/china-launches-kuaizhou-2-second-launch-24-hours/ (accessed September 12, 2018).

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